Us Romania Defense Cooperation Agreement

The United States and NATO member Romania have signed a ten-year roadmap for defense cooperation, which aims to achieve common strategic goals. Historically, States have tried to reassure partners in this way. In 1997, Romania declared that it would “increase its chances of rapidly joining NATO by developing a new partnership with Hungary” and made it clear that Hungary`s willingness to sign an agreement would convince Hungary`s partners – NATO member countries – of Romania`s intentions for cooperation. Footnote 93 The Estonian Minister of Defense similarly described a DCA with Turkey as a way to “show good relations with all members of the [NATO] Alliance,” in the hope that Turkey`s agreement would lead to the approval of Turkish partners. Footnote 94 And in 1998, Ukraine signed a major DCA with Argentina, in part to convince Argentina`s defense partners, particularly the United States, of Ukraine`s interest in cooperating with the West. Fn. 95 Secondly, the variation in the scope of the DSG raises questions of institutional organisation. In some cases, states establish a single defence framework. In other cases, states assemble multiple CADs in batches.

What explains the choice between these two options? Institutional design issues permeate CADs, including issues related to contract duration, ease of termination, renewal prospects, and, of course, scope. Are these characteristics a consequence of the type of regime, development, existing legal obligations or other influences? Could these design features be potentially endogenous to the network? I have argued that network connections provide information about design preferences, which indicates that certain institutional features can spread throughout the network and be created by this dissemination process as a balancing choice for states. In other words, already existing DCA connections don`t just promote the creation of new DCA; they could also promote the formation of certain types of EPAs. The pooled model cannot respond to unnoticed heterogeneity and, most importantly, does not offer sufficient leverage to test the causal claim that network influences favor CADs by disseminating information. I therefore turn to the estimation of fixed effects, combined with placebo-type tests, estimated between 1990 and 2010. Figure 9 illustrates the estimates. The left field corresponds to equation 1 (d.b. of the equation “first concordance”). . . .